downgrade its technology.
These two ingredients imply that the skill composition of the labor force affects the types of jobs that firms want to create. When the supply of skills is limited, it is not profitable to create jobs specially designed for the skilled, because it is difficult to find sklled workers and these jobs would not be as productive when employing unskilled workers. As a result, when there are few available skilled workers and there is a small gap between their productivity and that of the unsklled, the economy will be in a pooling equilibrium where firtns create "middling" jobs, do relatively little screening, and hire most applicants. Because in a pooling equilibrium both skilled and unskilled workers are employed in the same jobs with the same amount of physical capital, unskilled workers are employed at higher physical to human capital ratios than the skilled, and wage differentials are compressed. Also, because firms recruit most applicants, unemployment is low.
The alternative to pooling is a seprating equilibrinum in which firms create separate jobs for skilled and unskilled workers, and search for the appropriate candidates. Jobs for skilled workers are of a higher quality in a separating than in a pooling equilibrium, while unskilled jobs are of higher quality in a pooling equilibrium. As a result, in a separating equilibrium skilled workers eam more, and the unskilled less, than in a pooling allocation. Furthermore, since skilled workers produce only with highcapital firms and the unskilled work only with low-capital firms, the unemployment rates for both types of workers are higher. Starting from a pooling equilibrium, an increase in the proportion of skilled workers and/or skill-biased technical-change can push the economy to a separating equilibrium, changing the composition of jobs, reducing unskilled wages, and raising skilled wages and unemployment rates for both groups.
Both possible driving forces of this theory are empirically plausible. Many studies argue that the past two decades witnessed rapid skillbiased technical change (e.g., Eli Berman et al. 1994 ; David H. Autor et al. 1998 ). This period was also characterized by an unusually rapid increase in the supply of skills. For example, the ratio of college graduates to noncollege graduates in the labor force increased by over 54 percent between 1970 and 1980. Finally, there is some evidence suggesting that there was a change in the composition of jobs in the United States between the 1970's and the 1990's, consistent with a shift from a pooling to a separating equilibrium. In particular, high-wage fims are more selective in their hiring than they were 2 Katz and Murphy (1992) show that in the short run a higher supply of skilled workers reduces the skill premium. The forces I emphasize instead operate over a longer time frame as capital and job composition adjust. two decades ago, the distribution of physical capital to labor ratios across industries has become more unequal, workers appear to be better matched to their jobs, the distribution of on-thejob training across education groups has become more unequal, and some of the jobs in industries and occupations that typically pay close to the median of the wage distribution have been replaced by jobs from the more extreme parts of the quality distribution of jobs. These patterns are consistent with the theory outlined above and suggest that changes in the composition of jobs may be an important component of the changes in the structure of wages and unemployment. This paper builds on the search and matching models of Peter A. Diamond (1982) , Dale T. Mortensen (1982) , and Christopher A. Pissarides (1987) . In contrast to those and as in Michael Sattinger (1995) , Kenneth Burdett and Melvyn Coles (1997), and Robert J. Shimer and Lones A. Smith (1998), workers and firms are ex ante heterogeneous. The approach in this paper, however, constitutes an improvement over these studies because the heterogeneity of firms is not assumed exogenous but is derived from their investment decisions. In this respect the model has a similarity to Acemoglu (1996a), Steven J. Davis (1996) , and Acemoglu and Shimer (1998) , who also analyze models with ex ante investments. However, these papers do not discuss the changes in the composition of jobs, and do not allow for two-sided heterogeneity. My paper is also related to the growing literature on the causes of wage inequality, including Michael Kremer and Eric Maskin (1997) . They consider a model of assignrnent where workers of different skill levels form teams. If the distribution of skills is sufficiently disperse, a further increase in the variance of skills may induce high-skill workers to produce with other high-skill workers and increase inequality. Their approach is therefore complementary to, but different from, this paper. In particular, in their model there are no firms (independent from workers), so there is no change in the composition of jobs and in the recruitment practices of firms, which are at the heart of my paper. There is also no unemployment (hence no change in unemployment). Furthermore, in the data there is basically no increase in the variance of skills, which is the driving force in Kremer and Maskin's paper, whereas there is a large increase in the supply of skills, which is one of the driving forces in this paper. Finally, in more recent work (Acemoglu, 1998) , I extend the approach in this paper and point out another reason why an increase in the supply of skilled workers may increase inequality: when technical change is endogenous, an increase in the supply of skills increases the market size for skill-complementary technologies and may induce skill-bias technical change.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section I uses a static model to expose the main ideas. Section II considers a dynamic and more standard framework which confirms the main insights that follow from the static model, and generates a number of new results. Section III provides some evidence of a change in the composition of jobs in the United States. Section IV concludes.
L. A Static Model
In this section, I start with the simplest model of endogenous job composition. Firms choose what type of jobs to open and then search for workers. I show that there exist two types of equilibria with different structures of jobs and wages: pooling and separating. In the pooling equilibrium, firms open "middling" jobs and recruit all workers. In the separating equilibrium, firms create jobs designed for high-skill workers. I show that changes in the relative supply of skills and/or in technology can switch the economy from a pooling to a separating equilibrium, transforming the structure of wages and unemployment.
A. Preferences, Technology, and the Walrasian Allocation
There is a mass 1 of risk-neutral workers and a mass 1 of risk-neutral and profit-maximizing firms. The economy lasts for one period, and contains workers in two education groups, high and low (e.g., high-school and college graduates). There is no perfect overlap between education and skills, however, so both groups contain skilled and unskilled workers. Naturally, high-education workers are more likely to be skilled. I denote the overall fraction of skilled workers by 4, and normalize the human 1262   THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW  DECEMBER 1999 capital of unskilled workers to h = 1 and the human capital of skilled workers to h = 7 > 1. Production takes place in one firm-one worker pairs. A worker with human capital h and a firm with capacity k produce:
(1) y(h, k) = k`h . 
B. Equilibrium with Costly Search
Consider a trading environment with frictions and without the Walrasian auctioneer to mediate trade. Firms and workers come together randomly. Random matching implies that highand low-capacity firms are equally likely to meet skilled workers.4 I also assume that each firm meets one worker and vice versa. Once they meet, the worker-firm pair have to decide whether to produce together. In the dynamic version of the model, if the worker and the firm do not agree, they continue to search for a new partner, whereas here, because the economy lasts only for one period, the firm produces no output, and the worker receives zero income. Recall that at the wage-determination stage, the firm has already sunk the cost of capital, ck. Therefore, if the firnm and the worker agree, they will share the total output y(h, k). I assume that the worker obtains a fraction ,B of this amount, and the firm obtains the remainder. Hence, wages conditional oin the capacity choice of the firm are: WH(k) [ k1 a7a and wL(k) =--fk'-'.
To simplify the algebra, I also normalize c
(1 --I ,). The expected value of a firm choosing capacity k can be written as: where xi is the equilibrium probability that the firm produces with a worker of type j= L or H, conditional on matching with this worker. Since a fraction 0 of workers are skilled and there is random matching, the firm produces with a skilled worker with probability qxH, and obtains (1 -,B)y(q, k) --ck = (1 -P)[kl-ay`a -k]. The second part of (2) is explained similarly. Note that when the firm decides not to produce with the worker, i.e., x-0, it does not incur the cost of capital, ck.
In this static economy, workers are passive: they accept any match that comes along (since the alternative is to obtain zero). Therefore, an equilibrium is simply a distribution of capacity choices represented by the function F(k) over 3 An alternative interpretation is that there are many different types of firms, indexed by the variable k. In equilibrium, only the types that will make the highest profits will enter. Also note that the main results hold if the fimi incurs some cost clk when choosing its capacity, and also incurs the production costs ck, but the analysis becomes more complicated. If c = 0 so that all costs are incurred before matching, the static model would not work, but the dynamic model would give similar results. 
PROOF:
An equilibrium (k', xH(k'), xL(k')) maximizes (2). The first-order condition of (2) with respect to k for given xL and xH is: The first type of equilibrium is called pooling because firms choose the same amount of level of capacity (capital) and "pool" across the two types of workers. In this equilibrium, unskilled workers have higher physical to human capital ratios than skilled workers (kp versus kpI). This differential in physical to human capital ratios compresses the wage differential to WHI wL = 3y(Qq, kP)1/3y(1, kp) = 77a, which is lower than the wage differential in the Walrasian allocation, r. There is no unemployment in the pooling equilibrium because each worker meets a firm and they always agree. In the separating equilibrium, firms create separate jobs for skilled workers and turn down the unskilled, and skilled workers eam more than they did in the pooling equilibrium, because firms targeting the skilled choose a larger capacity, i.e., kH > kp, and so wH i -(3a[4,q + (1-Id))](la)/7,a/(1 -a) < wsep -P3a/(1 -a). In contrast, in a separating equilibrium, the earnings and employment of the unskilled collapse. Increases in 4 and q raise unskilled wages when the economy remains in Region I, because they increase kp, the level of capital that the unskilled work with (Acemoglu, 1996a ). Yet both changes hurt unskilled workers when the economy switches from pooling to separating equilibrium. Therefore, the impact of the supply of skills and technical change on unskilled workers is nonmonotonic. In interpreting these results, it is also worth bearing in mind that in the dynamic model, similar results will be obtained, but the separating equilibrium will also involve low capital jobs designed for the unskilled. As a result, when the economy switches from a pooling to a separating equilibrium, the unemployment rates for both types of workers will increase. Finally, since there is no perfect overlap between education and skills and higheducation workers are more likely to be skilled, when the economy switches from a pooling to a separating equilibrium, both residual wage inequality and returns to education increase as a result of the equilibrium switch.6
C. An Alternative Theory of U.S.
Labor-Market Changes
In the light of the comparative static results, the developments in the U.S. labor markets during the late 1970's and the 1980's can be given a different interpretation. Recall that neither the existing skill-biased technical change stories nor others that have been advanced readily pre-6 There is another reason why residual inequality and returns to education may increase together in this setting. Consider an extension of the basic model with a more general matching technology where skilled workers are more likely to meet high-capital firms. A previous version of the paper, Acemoglu (1996b) , demonstrated that the main results of the paper continue to hold, but there is an equilibrium distribution of capital. Some workers will draw a high wage from the distribution of jobs open to them, and there will be a distribution of wages for workers of the same skill level due to pure luck. In a separating equilibrium, the distribution of capital choices is more disperse than in a pooling equilibrium, so there is more wage dispersion among identical workers and greater residual wage inequality.
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dict: (i) the fall in unskilled wages; (ii) the increase in the unemployment rates of all workers; (iii) a change in the composition of jobs. As pointed out in the introduction, the first two features have accompanied the recent increase in wage inequality, and Section III will provide detailed evidence that there has been a change in the composition of jobs. First, suppose that, as many believe, the past 25 years have been characterized by skill-biased technical change, raising '1. The increase in '1 can move the economy from a pooling to a separating equilibrium. This creates a qualitative change in the composition of jobs, reducing unskilled wages and increasing wage inequality and unemployment. As noted above, an increase in the prices of skill-intensive goods due to international trade would have the same effects.
A more novel explanation for the U.S. labormarket trends also emerges from this simple model. The supply of skilled workers in the U.S. labor market increased sharply during the 1970's.7 A simple relative supply-demand approach would predict a decline in the relative wages of skilled workers in response to this increase. In the data, however, the large increase in the supply of skills during the 1970's is followed by a rise in the skill premium. In my model, when skilled workers become more abundant, firms find it profitable to design jobs for them rather than pool across the two skill groups. This transforms the structure of the labor market, increasing returns to education, residual inequality, and unemployment. Therefore, in contrast to the conventional approach, my theory predicts that even if technological possibilities remain unchanged, an increase in the proportion of skilled workers can switch the economy from a pooling to a separating equilibrium and increase inequality.
II. A Dynamic Model
I now describe a dynamic version of the environment of Section I which confirms the main insights obtained from the static model. When the economy switches from a pooling to a separating equilibrium, there will now be lowcapital jobs targeted at the unskilled as well as the high-capital jobs designed for the skilled, and the unemployment rate of skilled workers will also increase.
A. Technology, Preferences, and the Walrasian Allocation
Consider a continuous time economy populated by a mass 1 of infinitely lived risk-neutral agents, discounting the future at the rate r. Once again, a fraction 4 of these agents are skilled, with human capital h = 7q > 1, and the remaining 1 -are unskilled with h = 1. On the other side of the market, there is a larger mass of risk-neutral firms, also discounting the future at the same rate r. Each firm can employ at most one worker and is in one of three states: inactive, unfilled vacancy, and filled job. Inactive firms obtain a payoff of 0, and can rent a site to open a vacancy. There are 0 2 1 sites and the flow rental price of a site is ry. The equilibrium rental price y will be determined in equilibrium. Unfilled vacancies meet an unemployed worker at the instantaneous rate q, and unemployed workers meet a vacancy at the rate p; p and q are assumed exogenous, and p, q < oo so that decentralized trading takes time.
At every instant, some of the existing firms exit and new firms rent their sites. Immediately upon renting a site, and before meeting a worker, each firm has to design a job and choose its capacity (capital), k. As in the static model, this (irreversible) capacity choice captures the type of job created and its quality, and the firm incurs no costs until matching. New and old unfilled vacancies search for workers, and upon meeting a worker, they decide whether to employ the worker and whether to The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix A, which is available upon request. In equilibrium, there are at most three different levels of capacity, and one of these, kH, is equal to an, and is chosen by firms which only produce with skilled workers. kL maximizes (4) when xH = 0 and xL = 1, and is chosen by firms which only produce with unskilled workers. Finally, kp, the capacity choice of firms producing with both types of workers, maximizes (4) at xH xL = 1.
C. Pooling and Separating Equilibria
I denote the fraction of vacancies with capacities kL, kP, and k H by AL, gp, and pLH. A pooling steady-state equilibrium is an allocation where up-= 1, so that all firms create middling jobs with capacity kp and recruit all workers they meet. In this equilibrium, u H = UL and A = q5. Because all jobs have the same capacity, workers' outside options do not bind (firms' outside options never bind-see Appendix A, Figure 2 . Intuitively, a pooling equilibrium requires that firms find it profitable to employ skilled and unskilled workers in the same type of job, a strategy which will be profitable when the productivity differential between the two types of labor, -, is small. Also, the strategy of choosing a higher capacity and searching for skilled workers, the main alternative to pooling, will be less profitable when the fraction of skilled workers, 4, is small. Hence (11) traces a downward-sloping curve. Three important features of the pooling equilibrium are: (i) there is only one type of job with capacity, kp, which employs both skilled and unskilled workers. Therefore, as noted in Section I, skilled workers are employed at a lower capacity to human capital ratio than unskilled workers (kpl/r versus kp); (ii) as a result of the first observation, wage differentials are com- 'Ti, and so there is more wage inequality in the separating equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium. While skilled workers obtain higher wages in the separating equilibrium, i.e., wp> W1001P the unskilled receive less, i.e., W'ep L< This is because in the separating equilibrium, firms targeting the unskilled choose kL < kP9 so the unskilled work at lower capital firms and earn less; (iii) the unemployment rates for both groups are higher than in the pooling equilibrium, because high-capital firms do not accept unskilled workers, and the skilled prefer to wait for jobs designed for them. Separating and pooling equilibria are not the only possibilities. There can also be "mxed equilibria" with p , p H> 0, where some firms choose kP and pool, while others choose kH and only accept skilled workers. In this equilibrium, there is higher unskilled unemployment than upOo1, but since all firms accept skilled workers, skilled unemployment is still equal to upoo,. Unskilled wages are lower in the mixed equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium because 
A. Changing Recruitmnent Practices of Firms
The first piece of evidence is that there has been a change in the recruitment practices of firns. In my model, the pooling equilibrium is a situation where firms recruit all applicants. In 19) . Ford at the time was a high-wage employer, and its lack of screening can be interpreted as a pooling strategy: it realized that some of the workers would be less productive, but it still chose to recruit them because it was not profitable to search and wait for more skilled workers. In contrast, similar companies in the late 1980's appear to use a very different recruitment strategy. Murnane and Levy discuss the cases of Honda of America, Diamond Star Motors, and Northwestern Mutual Life. These are high-wage employers, with somewhat higher real wages than Ford in the 1960's, and the first two are in the same industry as Ford. All three companies spend substantial resources on recruitment and hire only a fraction of those who apply. The first two use formal cognitive tests, including mathematics, aptitude, and English tests, as well as a series of lengthy interviews. The third company employs more intensive interviews but no formal tests. The interview process in all three companies is quite costly as it involves a large number of fellow employees and managers, but they view this as a worthwhile activity. Although there may be different interpretations for these trends (e.g., the increased importance of team production), a plausible interpretation is that firms are no longer happy to "pool" across different skills, and they want to hire only high-skill workers for their relatively high-quality jobs. Moreover, in line with the theory in this paper, not all employers are following this hiring strategy. Murnane and Levy discuss the case of another company, Sports Plus, which employs assemblers. It pays between $5.50 and $7.00 per hour, offers little training, and basically hires every applicant without any screening.
The results of Peter Cappelli and Steffanie Wilk (1997) are also of interest in this context. They employ a new data set of 2,945 establishments to analyze the determinants of hiring practices and intensity of screening of production workers. Of most interest for this paper's focus, they look at how average wages of production workers, average education of production workers, the reported level of skill requirements of jobs, and the fraction of workers using computers covary with hiring practices. They find that each of these four variables has a statistically significant and robust positive effect on selection intensity, and the component of screening that increases most in response to these variables is selection on education and ability (as opposed to experience or recommendation). Therefore, firms using more computers and more skills, which are also the ones offering higher-wage jobs, spend more resources on screening in order to find workers that have the required level of education and are generally "6skilled." These results are cross-sectional and cannot be directly extrapolated to changes from the 1970's to the 1990's. Nonetheless, combined with the case study evidence, they suggest that the widespread increase in computer use (Autor et al., 1998) and rising skill requirements (Cappelli, 1996; Murnane and Levy, 1996) are likely to have been associated with increased screening.
B. Changes in Mismatch Between
Jobs and Workers
In a pooling equilibrium high-and low-skill workers are employed in the same jobs using the same quality equipment. Therefore, skilled workers, employed at the physical to human capital ratio kp/h, are "overskilled" for their job, while the unskilled, working at the physical to human capital ratio kp, are "underskilled." In contrast, in a separating equilibrium, both types of workers are employed at the physical to human capital ratio a where kp > a > kplI1. So, workers are better matched to their jobs in separating equilibrium than in pooling equilibrium. The forces I discuss may be less important for education than for other dimensions of skills, because schooling is observable, making the search for educated workers relatively easy. Nevertheless, in a world of costly search and imperfect correlation between skills and education, there will be educational mismatch in the labor market, and more so in a pooling equilibrium. Therefore, the approach in this paper predicts less over-and undereducation during the 1980's than in the 1970's.
There is a large literature on overeducation in the labor market. The most interesting and careful paper in this literature is by Nachum Sicherman (1991), who studies data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in response to the question: "How much formal education is required to get a job like yours?" He constructs over-and undereducation variables by subtracting the response to this question from actual education. He finds that workers who report to be overeducated for their job earn less than others with the same amount of education, but more than workers with less education doing the same job. This is reversed for undereducated workers. Moreover, overeducated workers switch to higher-wage jobs more quickly than others, suggesting that they are truly overeducated for their jobs, rather than less skilled in some other dimension unobserved to the econometrican. These findings are consistent with this paper's predictions: on average, overeducated workers are those working with lower physical to human capital ratios; they earn less than workers with the same education, but more than others with lower education working with the same amount of physical capital.
The question on required education in the PSID is asked in 1976, 1978, and 1985. Sicherman pools the three years. Here I repeat this exercise separately for each year to see whether the amount of over-and undereducation (mismatch) has changed from mid-1970's to 1980's.9 First, results not reported here confirm that Sicherman's findings hold in each year, and the coefficients in these cross-sectional regressions, except the return to schooling, are quite similar, suggesting that there has not been a major change in the interpretation of these questions by the respondents. The key results for my hypothesis are reported in Table 1 . The sample includes male heads of households between the ages 18 and 60, who are currently in employment or temporarily laid off, excluding the selfemployed. No other sample restrictions are applied. The first part of Table 1 reports the number and fraction of workers who have their last grade completed within the bracket of required education (exact), those who have more education than required for their jobs (overeducated), and those with less education than required (undereducated) for each year. The columns (4) to (6) give the mean years of overeducation for each group, with standard deviations in parentheses. Recall that overeducation is defined as actual minus required education, so a negative number means that required education for that group exceeds actual education. Finally, the last two rows give the variance and average absolute deviation of the overeducation variable.
The results in Table 1 Table 2 shows that 35 percent of employment was in the top and bottom 25 percent job categories. By 1993, this number had risen to just under 38 percent. So, approximately 2.5 percent more workers now have either higher-or lowerquality jobs rather than middling jobs. In other words, the fraction of employment in highestand lowest-quality job categories has increased approximately by 7 percent of its 1983 value. These changes are not due to business-cycle variations: the years 1983-1984 were at a similar stage of the business cycle to 1992-1993. It is possible that even more major changes in job composition took place before 1983, but due to 10 The cells above the 75th percentile include, among others, transport, mining, and communication technicians; speciality occupations in transport, business and repair services, construction, finance, communications, hospital, and mining, durable manufacturing sales occupations, and a variety of executive, administrative, and managerial occupations. The cells below the 25th percentile include handlers, laborers, and a variety service occupations in a variety of industries, including retail trade (which includes, among others, department and food stores, eating and drinking places), business and repair, and social services. Finally, to investigate longer-term changes, I looked at census data on 138 industries from 1970 to 1990.12 1 do not know of any consistent " These are an extended version of the 2-digit occupations created by splitting some of the larger occupations along the 3-digit lines (see Acemoglu, 1997) .
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12 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and public administration are excluded. These are industries aggregated consistently across the censuses and used in Autor et al. (1998) . 1 thank David Autor for providing me with these data.
